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THE RELEVANCE OF CONDUCT AND CHARACTER
TO GUILT AND PUNISHMENT
BENJAMIN B. SENDOR*
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider these two basic principles of modern American
criminal law: (1) To be guilty of a crime means to be guilty of
committing a prohibited act, or a series of related acts, with a
designated culpable state of mind. Although a defendant's char-
acter sometimes can function as evidence of whether the defend-
ant committed the alleged act with a culpable mental state, the
defendant's character is not itself a criterion or an element of
guilt. (2) However, once a defendant is convicted of a crime, the
sentencer can consider the defendant's bad or good character as
a criterion for determining the appropriate punishment.
This description of the distinctions made by modem crimi-
nal law in the relevance of culpable conduct and character to
guilt and punishment is obviously correct. Whether criminal law
should function in this way is an important normative question,
and a question this article will address. However, as a matter of
purely descriptive fact, criminal law does assign different roles to
a defendant's culpable act and a defendant's character in deter-
mining guilt and punishment. Even ifjurors in some cases might
ignore these rules and convict or acquit a defendant on the basis
of bad or good character, and even if prosecutors or defense
attorneys sometimes encourage jurors to do so, any such verdicts
would represent instances of jury nullification. As a matter of
principle, these distinctions are bedrock rules of criminal law.
However, some scholars, such as George Fletcher,1 Michael
Bayles,2 Richard Brandt,' Nicola Lacey,4 Robert Nozick,5 and
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1. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.3.1 (1978).
2. Michael D. Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, 1 LAw
& PHIL. 5 (1982).
3. RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY 465-74 (1959); Richard B:
Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal Law, in NoMos XXVII:
CRIMINALJusTICE 165, 175 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1985)
[hereinafter Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses].
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George Vuoso,6 have suggested that a defendant's bad or good
character is a criterion of guilt as well as of punishment.7 The
suggestion that a defendant's character is a criterion of guilt
tends to arise in discussions of the exculpatory function of
excuses. These commentators, whom I shall call "character theo-
rists," contend that excuses operate to exculpate a defendant
because they block an inference that a criminal act reflects, or is
attributable to, the defendant's bad character. The term "bad
character" in this context means a "settled disposition"8 or
enduring inclination to commit acts that violate the law.9
Although this argument about the relevance of character to
guilt arises in analyses of excuses, the point of the argument
clearly extends beyond the role of excuses. That is, if excuses
4. NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT 67-78 (1988).
5. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 381-84, 394-96 (1981).
6. George Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE LJ. 1661
(1987).
7. As Michael Moore has observed in Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character,
and Excuse, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Autumn 1989, at 29, 40 n.38, their position
can be traced to the eighteenth century philosopher David Hume, who wrote
that "[a] ctions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where
they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the
person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honor, if good;
nor infamy, if evil.... For as actions are objects of our moral sentiment, so far
only as they are indications of the internal character, passions, and affections
.... .DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 100-02
(Henry Regnery ed., 1965).
Traces of this view can also be found in the Commentaries to the Model
Penal Code. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.04, at 275
(1985) (excuse of mistake-of-law applies when "act charged is consistent with
the entire law-abidingness of the actor"); id. § 210.3, at 55 (provocation defense
recognizes that "one who kills in response to certain provoking events should
be regarded as demonstrating a significantly different character deficiency than
one who kills in their absense").
8. LACEY, supra note 4, at 66-68.
9. See generally Michael Moore's discussion of the meaning of the term
"character" in Moore, supra note 7, at 40-48. See also BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY,
supra note 3, at 465-68 (defining a character trait as a relatively enduring
"response-tendency" that is regarded normatively either as a virtue or a vice and
is within the actor's control to a high degree); Brandt, A Motivational Theory of
Excuses, supra note 3, at 165, 174 (equating character with "standing
motivation"; basing guilt upon proof that defendant's behavior resulted from a
"defect" in motivation, where defects are those identified by criminal
prohibitions); Vuoso, supra note 6, at 1670 (character defined as "the collection
of many of [a person's] dispositions to act").
Note that "bad character" does not necessarily entail an enduring
inclination to violate the law, though such a quality of defiance certainly could
be a facet of a given defendant's character. Rather, bad character here means
merely an enduring inclination to commit a certain kind of act (e.g., theft,
assault, or fraud) that the law does in fact prohibit.
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identify situations in which particular criteria of guilt are not sat-
isfied, then excuses also identify those criteria of guilt them-
selves. If excuses tell us which criterion of guilt is missing, they
thereby identify that criterion as an essential element of guilt. By
telling us that the absence of a criterion must exculpate a
defendant, excuses tell us that the absent criterion must be pres-
ent to convict a defendant.'" Thus, when character theorists
maintain that excuses function by blocking the ordinary infer-
ence that commission of a criminal act reflects or is attributable
to the defendant's character, they thereby maintain that this
inference is a criterion of guilt.
According to character theory, then, the commission of a
criminal act ordinarily creates an inference that the act either
reflects or is attributable to the defendant's character. Character
theory regards that inference as an essential criterion of guilt.
Excuses operate to exculpate a defendant under character theory
by blocking the creation of that inference.
In this article I will advance two theses. First, I will contend
that the character theory of excuses and guilt is not an accurate
description of modem American criminal law because criminal
law does not make bad character a criterion of guilt. Second, I
will propose that bad character should not be adopted as a crite-
rion of guilt. In doing so, I will suggest several reasons that sup-
port the law's principle that a defendant's bad character should
not be a criterion of guilt but that a defendant's good or bad
character should be a criterion of punishment (although not the
only criterion of punishment).
10. As philosopherJ.L. Austin wrote in his famous essay, A Plea for Excuses:
"to examine excuses is to examine cases where there has been some
abnormality or failure: and as so often, the abnormal will throw light on the
normal, will help us to penetrate the blinding veil of ease and obviousness that
hides the mechanisms of the natural successful act." J.L. Austin, A Plea for
Excuses, in FREEDOM AND REsPONSiBLrrv 6, 8 (Herbert Morris ed., 1961). See also
BRANDT, ETHiCAL THEORY, supra note 3, at 472 ("Because excuses, in moral
contexts, shield from the charge of reprehensible conduct, it will be of interest,
as evidence for or against our definition of "reprehensible," to see what kinds of
statement function as excuses. As defenses against the charge of acting
reprehensibly, their content tells us, presumably, about the substance of the
charge."); Moore, supra note 7, at 29; Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as
Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements
of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1415-23 (1986) [hereinafter Sendor, Crime as
Communication]; Benjamin B. Sendor, Mistakes of Fact: A Study in the Structure of
Criminal Conduct, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 707, 720-50 (1990) [hereinafter
Sendor, Mistakes of Fact] (defenses, including excuses, can help identify criteria
of guilt; they represent situations in which particular criteria of guilt are
absent).
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This article is divided into three sections. Section II
describes the character theory of guilt, including character the-
ory's view of excuses. Section III the article shows that character
theory does not accurately describe modem American criminal
law, including the law of excuses. Section IV discusses why the
criminal law should focus solely on culpable acts as criteria of
guilt and should consider both acts and character as criteria of
punishment. The final section also discusses an important, cor-
rect insight of character theory - namely, that criminal conduct
conveys certain meaning - and shows how this insight, when
properly understood in a way that differs from character theory's
analysis, identifies the essential criterion of criminal culpability.
II. CHARACTER THEORY OF GUILT AND ExcUSES
At first glance, the character theory of guilt and excuses has
genuine appeal. Although I believe it is fundamentally incorrect,
I think that when we separate its wheat from its chaff, it offers
some valuable insights into the nature of guilt and the role of
excuses. To understand its appeal, its mistakes, and its insights, it
is important to understand character theory clearly.
According to character theorists, the commission of a crime
creates a particular inference about an offender's character.
Michael Moore (a strong critic of character theory) has helpfully
identified three versions of the inference in the literature." One
version is that the commission of a crime expresses or reflects the
offender's "bad character" - that is, the commission of the
crime expresses or reflects or is evidence of the offender's endur-
ing inclination or settled disposition to violate the law. For
example, Nicola Lacey has written that character theory bases
"actions for which we hold a person fully responsible are those in
which her usual character is centrally expressed." 2 She further
writes, "it is unfair to hold people responsible for actions which
are out of character, but only fair to hold them so for actions in
which their settled dispositions are centrally expressed."'"
The second version is that the commission of the crime is
caused by, or is attributable to, the offender's bad character -
that is, the commission of the crime is caused by, or is attributa-
ble to, the offender's enduring inclination or settled disposition
11. Moore, supra note 7, at 47-48. See also Samuel H. Pillsbury, The
Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility, 67
IND. L.J. 719, 730-33 (1992) (identifying and criticizing two of the three versions
of character theory).
12. LAcE, supra note 4, at 66.
13. Id. at 68.
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to engage in conduct that violates the law. For example, Richard
Brandt has written that "persons who have unjustifiably broken
valid law should be exempt from punishment unless their behav-
ior is a result of standing motivation (one might say "character"
instead) . "..."14
A third version combines these two versions. The third ver-
sion claims that moral and criminal judgment of a person for
committing an act is appropriate only if the act reflects the per-
son's character. This version further claims that an act reflects a
person's character only if it is caused by the person's character.
George Vuoso has argued in favor of this combined version.
Vuoso explains:
What an actor does is relevant to a moral evaluation of him
only to the extent that it reflects on the sort of person he
is.... Whether an action merits praise or blame, or reward
or punishment, will depend on how it reflects on the
agent, or on something enduring in the agent (which, fol-
lowing tradition, we are calling his "character") .... If an
action is caused or determined by the agent's character, it
is clear that it reflects on his character: It was his character
or some aspect of it that helped bring the action about. If
an action is due to chance, it is clear that it does not reflect
on the agent's character.15
For the purposes of this essay, there is no need to choose
one of these versions over the others. They all regard an infer-
ence from a defendant's act to a defendant's character as a crite-
rion of moral judgment and guilt. They are all equally
vulnerable to the criticisms to be discussed in Sections III and IV
of this essay.
Under character theory, the role of excuses pertains to the
inference from criminal act to bad character. Character theorists
14. Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses, supra note 3, at 165. See also
NozicK, supra note 5, at 383 ("Excuses show an act is not to be attributed to a
defect of character . . . ."). The nature of the causal relationship between a
character trait and an act - how a character trait "causes" an act or how an act
is attributable to a character trait - is beyond the scope of this article.
Ultimately, that issue hinges largely on the definition of the concept of a
character trait. See Peter Arenella, Character, Choice, and Moral Agency: The
Relevance of Character to Our Moral Culpability Judgments, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 59,
79-80 (1990); Moore, supra note 7, at 41-44 (describing character traits as
motivational or dispositional states to feel certain types of emotions and to
engage in certain types of acts).
15. Vuoso, supra note 6, at 1673-74 (emphasis in original). See also
Moore, supra note 7, at 48 (describing third version as maintaining that
"[s]ome act A will evidence some trait C if and only if not only C causes A, but
also states of type C typically cause events of type A").
1996]
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contend that excuses function by blocking the inference that a
criminal act reflects or is caused by a defendant's enduring incli-
nation to commit acts that violate the law. In other words, if a
jury acquits a defendant on the basis of an excuse, for conduct
that otherwise would be a crime, the jury says, in effect, that the
defendant is not guilty because the excuse prevents the jury from
making the ordinary inference that the defendant's otherwise
criminal conduct either expresses or is attributable to the
defendant's bad character.
To understand character theory's view of excuses, a brief
introduction to the law of excuses will be helpful. The law recog-
nizes two general categories of excuses. First, "incapacity"
excuses arise when a defendant lacks physical, volitional, or cog-
nitive capacities at the time of the alleged offense that are neces-
sary to choose to avoid committing the offense.16 For example,
insanity and retardation are incapacity excuses. In addition,
although infancy technically functions as a total jurisdictional bar
to prosecution of an accused juvenile offender from the state's
criminal jurisdiction, rather than as an excuse, in theory it never-
theless operates as an incapacity excuse, too.17 Second, there are
situational or "no-fair-opportunity" excuses, which arise when a
person has the requisite capacities to choose to avoid committing
a crime at the time of the alleged offense, but circumstances not
fairly attributable to the person deprive him or her of a fair
opportunity to avoid committing the crime. 8 Examples of no-
fair-opportunity excuses include duress, accident, and mistake of
fact.
To understand character theory's view of excuses, it is also
necessary to have a clear grasp of the precise claims of character
theory. The basic claim of character theory concerning the
nature of guilt is that criminal conduct creates a particular infer-
ence about an offender's character. The theory infers that the
conduct either expresses or is attributable to the offender's bad
character - the offender's enduring inclination to commit acts
that violate the law. It is vital to recognize that character theory
does not claim that an excuse blocks all inferences about a
16. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw § 17.03[E] (1995);
Joshua Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for
its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1356-60, 1365-67 (1989); Joshua
Dressier, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses, and the
Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 701-02, 715 (1988) [hereinafter Dressier,
Excusing Wrongdoers]; Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257,
259-61 (1987); Sendor, Mistakes of Fact, supra note 10, at 716.
17. 2 PAUL H. RoBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 175 (1984).
18. See supra note 16.
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defendant's character. Character theory's claim is narrower: it
claims that an excuse blocks the inference that criminal conduct
expresses or is attributable to the defendant's bad character.19
This refinement of this "inference" as an inference about
bad character is essential for character theory. The role of inca-
pacity excuses under character theory illustrates the importance
of this refinement. Incapacity defenses do not necessarily block
the inference that criminal conduct reflects or is attributable to
the defendant's character in some manner. Consider this exam-
ple: if a defendant presents a convincing insanity defense based
upon proof of a serious and chronic mental illness, the defend-
ant's insanity does not block an inference that the defendant's
conduct reflects or is attributable to the defendant's character in
some fashion. On the contrary, the force and credibility of the
insanity defense in that case rests on the inference that the
defendant's conduct does reflect something important about the
defendant's character, or that something important about
defendant's character did cause the defendant's conduct. In
such a case, the defendant's mental illness is the important fea-
ture of the defendant's character that is relevant to the defend-
ant's responsibility; the law excuses the defendant by reason of
insanity precisely because the defendant's conduct does reflect,
or is attributable to, the defendant's mental illness. It is only
when an otherwise sane and law-abiding defendant pleads tem-
porary insanity that the insanity defense might block the infer-
ence that the criminal act reflects or is attributable to the
defendant's character, to the defendant's enduring personality
traits.
20
19. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 10.3.1; Vuoso, supra note 6, at 1670.
20. According to Richard Brandt's position, insanity would block an
inference from act to character because Brandt's definition of character
includes a normative component. Brandt distinguishes between personality
and character. According to Brandt, a personality trait is a relatively enduring
response-tendency of a person. In Brandt's view, a character trait is not just a
relatively enduring trait, but also is a trait with normative value - either a
virtue or a vice - and a trait over which an actor has substantial control. In
other words, for Brandt, the very concept of a character trait has a built-in
connotation of "good" or "bad" trait over which an actor has considerable
control. Clearly, mental illness is not a feature of personality that is either
normatively good or bad and it is not a feature over which an actor has
substantial control. In Brandt's view, then, insanity would not block all
inferences from act to personality, but it would block all inferences from act to
character. BRANDT, ETHiCAL THEORY, supra note 3, at 465-68.
In this essay, I use the terms "personality trait" and "character trait"
interchangeably, without any inherent normative connotation, to refer to any
enduring feature of an actor's personality. Given that usage here, it is
important to clarify that the claim of character theory is that the commission of
1996]
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Under character theory, then, the insanity defense in the
case of a chronically disturbed defendant does not operate by
blocking an inference that the defendant's criminal conduct
expresses or is attributable to the defendant's character gener-
ally. Rather, the insanity defense in such a case blocks an infer-
ence that the criminal act reflects, or is attributable to the
defendant's bad character. The character theorist would argue
that a person has a bad character if and only if he or she has both
an enduring inclination to commit acts that violate the law and
the capacity to resist the inclination. A mentally ill defendant
might have an enduring inclination to commit criminally prohib-
ited acts and, therefore, such a defendant might have a dangerous
character. However, a dangerous character is not the same as a
bad character. To have a dangerous character, a person need
have only an enduring disposition to commit acts prohibited by
the criminal law. To have a bad character, a person must have
both a long-term inclination to commit legally prohibited acts
and the necessary capacities to resist that inclination. According
to character theory, then, an incapacity excuse operates by block-
ing a particular inference about the defendant's bad character:
that the defendant's conduct expresses or is attributable to the
enduring inclination of a defendant to commit criminally pro-
hibited acts when the defendant has the necessary capacities to
resist that inclination.
Under character theory, "no-fair-opportunity" excuses also
function by blocking an inference that criminal conduct reflects
bad character. However, the rationale for no-fair-opportunity
excuses differs slightly from the rationale for incapacity excuses.
The rationale for situational excuses under character theory is
that an excuse blocks the inference from criminal conduct to
bad character because that inference requires yet one more
ingredient: not only the requisite capacities to resist the endur-
ing inclination to engage in criminally prohibited conduct, but
also a fair opportunity to avoid such conduct. Under character
theory, then, the inference from criminal conduct to bad charac-
ter requires both that the defendant have the requisite capacities
a criminal act creates an inference about the offender's bad personality or bad
character.
Nicola Lacey appears to disagree even with the contention that the
conduct of a mentally ill person can meaningfully reflect any personality traits
in Brandt's non-normative sense of personality. LAcEY, supra note 4, at 74.
Lacey's view seems to underestimate the degree to which the conduct of
mentally ill people can reflect enduring dispositions or patterns that can
correctly be regarded as personality traits.
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to avoid the conduct and that the defendant have a fair opportu-
nity to avoid such conduct.
As an example of character theory's treatment of a situa-
tional excuse, consider a hunter who claims that her shooting of
a bystander was accidental because some of the buckshot fired at
an animal ricocheted off a boulder and struck the victim, a victim
whom she reasonably did not believe was in the vicinity. In this
hypothetical illustration, the hunter does not claim that she
lacked the necessary capacities to avoid shooting the bystander.
Indeed, she can prove that she is a mentally normal, faithfully
law-abiding person. Her plea of accident rests on the argument
that since she reasonably did not know that the bystander was in
the vicinity, it would not be just to blame her for shooting the
bystander. In other words, the exculpatory rationale of her
excuse of accident is that her conduct cannot be said to express,
or cannot be attributed to, an enduring inclination to commit
criminally prohibited acts because she did not have a fair oppor-
tunity to avoid shooting the bystander.2'
In this case, the excuse of accident does block an inference
that her shooting reflects bad character. However, it is essential
to consider why the accidental nature of the shooting blocks that
inference. After all, what if the hunter really does have a bad
character? What if she would have shot at the animal even if she
saw the passerby standing right next to the animal? According to
character theory, the accident succeeds as an exculpating condi-
tion because we (or the jury, speaking on our behalf) conclude
that the hunter lacked a fair opportunity to avoid the shooting.
Since she reasonably did not know that the bystander was in the
vicinity, her shooting of the bystander cannot be said to reflect
her enduring disposition to engage in criminally prohibited con-
duct and cannot be attributed to any such disposition. Even if
she would have shot at the animal had she known of the
bystander's presence, her reasonable ignorance of the
bystander's presence prevents a trier of fact from inferring the
existence of that disposition on the basis of her conduct. The
trier of fact cannot determine that the shooting of the bystander
either reflects the hunter's long-term inclination to engage in
criminally prohibited conduct or was caused by her long-term
inclination to engage in criminally prohibited conduct.
Before leaving this initial discussion of the character theory
of guilt and excuses, it is important to take note of another, very
different type of theory of guilt and excuses that rests in part on
21. See BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY, supra note 3, at 472; Brandt, A
Motivational Theoy of Excuses, supra note 3, at 176.
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an understanding of a defendant's character. Under this other
theory - which can be called the moral agency theory of charac-
ter - character is not regarded as an element of guilt. This
alternative character-based theory does not claim that guilt
requires proof that an act either reflects or is attributable to the
defendant's bad character. Rather, the moral agency theory
claims that in order to be held responsible and to be found guilty
for specific acts, a defendant must be a moral agent; in order to
be a moral agent, a defendant must have certain character attrib-
utes or capacities. The moral agency theory views certain charac-
ter traits as conditions of moral agency, which, in turn, is a
condition of guilt for specific conduct. Peter Arenella has
argued in favor of this moral agency theory of character.1
2
Michael Moore, who has vigorously criticized the form of charac-
ter theory involving character-based judgments of guilt, agrees
with the proposition that to be a moral agent, a person must have
certain capacities. 23 Indeed, the law's very acceptance of inca-
pacity excuses necessarily and obviously rests on the premise that
only people with the requisite capacities to avoid violating the law
can be found guilty of violating the law.
The only significant debate about the moral agency theory
of character is over which capacities are necessary. For example,
Peter Arenella has argued that a person must have a capacity for
.moral responsiveness":
A capacity for moral responsiveness presupposes that moral
agents appreciate the normative significance of the moral
norms governing their behavior. It also assumes that
moral agents can exercise moral judgment about how these
norms apply to a particular context. Acting on the basis of
moral judgment requires moral motivation: the desire to use
the applicable moral norm as the basis of acting. Finally,
moral agents must be able to act on these "moral motiva-
tions," despite conflicting desires and impulses. This latter
ability is only possible if the moral agent can control or
revise those aspects of her character that impair her ability
to appreciate or comply with applicable moral norms on
any particular occasion. Thus, moral agents must have
22. Arenella, supra note 14; Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally
Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1511 (1992) [hereinafter Arenella, Convicting the Morally
Blameless].
23. MICHAEL S. MooRE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 13-14, 83, 195-97, 244-45
(1984); Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1091, 1137-
39, 1148-49 (1985); Moore, supra note 7, at 37-39. See also Pillsbury, supra note
11, at 745-47; Sendor, Crime as Communication, supra note 10, at 1393-94.
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some modest capacity for critical self-reflection and self-revi-
sion. This capacity for moral responsiveness encompasses
several distinct but interrelated abilities to react to applica-
ble moral norms in thought, feeling, perception, and
behavior.
24
Michael Moore has written that a capacity for "practical rea-
soning" is a condition of guilt, and that practical reasoning itself
requires such capacities as perception, memory, imagination,
learning, reasoning, feeling emotion, and the will to fulfill emo-
tions and desires.2 5 Commentators, notably including Arenella,
Moore, and Samuel Pillsbury, have debated about which capaci-
ties are necessary to deem a person to be a moral agent who is
responsible or culpable for his or her conduct. 26 Arenella has
criticized Moore's view of the requisite capacities as too "thin,"
contending that the necessary capacities together entail the
expansive quality of moral responsiveness described above.2 7
However, this particular debate is concerned only with the requi-
site capacities for moral agency, not with whether bad character
is a criterion of guilt.
I have briefly discussed the moral agency theory of character
here only to make it clear that my criticism of what I call the
"character theory" does not pertain to the moral agency theory.
I fully agree with Arenella, Moore, and Pillsbury that to be guilty
of a crime, a defendant must be a moral agent at the time of the
crime and, that to be a moral agent, a defendant must have cer-
tain capacities (or character attributes). However, as Arenella
has correctly emphasized, the moral agency theory does not make
the additional claim that guilt entails a judgment about the
defendant's bad character. Arenella has cautioned against
conflat[ing] two separate and independent elements of
moral culpability analysis: (1) what attributes the actor
needs to qualify as a moral agent who has the capacity to
act like a reasonable person, and (2) whether an act-based
24. Arenella, supra note 14, at 82.
25. MooRs, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY, supra note 23, at 13-14, 83, 195-97, 244-
45; Moore, Causation and the Excuses, supra note 23, at 1137-39, 1148-49;
Moore, supra note 7, at 37-39. See also Pillsbury, supra note 11, at 745-47 (moral
agency required for criminal responsibility requires mental states, rationality,
noncoercion, and experience over time with personal pain and pleasure);
Sendor, Crime as Communication, supra note 10, at 1393-94 (responsibility entails
cognitive and volitional capacities to take into account a variety of sensory,
intellectual, emotional, and normative factors in determining conduct).
26. Arenella, supra note 14; Moore, supra note 7, at 37-39; Pillsbury, supra
note 11, at 733-47.
27. Arenella, supra note 14, at 64, 82.
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or character-based moral judgment best reflects the type of
moral blame imposed by our legal blamingjudgments. We
might blame criminals for their choice to violate act-
regarding norms, but the culpability of their choice might
depend on our assumption that moral agents can control
those aspects of their characters that motivate such
choices.28
To summarize thus far, the character-based theory of judg-
ment claims that a criminal act gives rise to an inference that the
act reflects or is attributable to the defendant's bad character,
and that an excuse functions by blocking that inference. In con-
trast, the character-based theory of moral agency claims only that
moral judgment (or, in criminal law, a judgment of guilt) for
certain conduct is appropriate only if, at the time of the conduct,
the defendant had the requisite capacities to act as a moral
agent. I fully subscribe to the character-based theory of moral
agency. I do not agree with the character-based theory of guilt
(or of moral judgment) and it is to the critique of that theory
that I shall now turn.
III. THE CHARACTER-BASED THEORY OF GUILT AND EXCUSES IS
AT ODDS WITH AMERICAN LAW
This critique of the character-based theory of guilt and
excuses will begin by showing that character theory does not fit
the views of modem American criminal law about the nature and
criteria of guilt and the exculpatory role of excuses. Of course,
such a showing does not by itself disprove character theory. After
all, it may be that character theory is right and that American
criminal law should change to the extent it does not mesh with
character theory. However, showing that character theory is out
of step with the actual criminal law should at least generate skep-
ticism about the claims of character theory. After this section
shows how character theory is at odds with criminal law, Section
IV discusses why character theory should be rejected.
28. Id. at 74. Although Arenella emphasizes the importance of the
distinction between character attributes as requirements for moral agency and
character attributes as criteria of moral judgments about moral agents, he
sometimes seems to slide back toward the character theory of moral judgment.
For example, after making this distinction, Arenella writes, "[t]his limited
version of a character-responsibility theme suggests that when our criminal acts
do reflect some established feature of our characters, our moral culpability does
not lie exclusively in our rational choice to do wrong. The ultimate basis for
our culpability may lie in our failure to do something about those aspects of our
character that make it so difficult for us to avoid engaging in morally
objectionable conduct." Id. at 81.
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A. Character Theory Does Not Explain the Exculpatory Power of
Excuses
This subsection will show that character theory does not fit
the law's view of excuses. The next subsection will show that the
theory's more fundamental claim about the criteria of guilt seri-
ously conflicts with modem criminal law.
It is true that excuses can block an inference that criminal
conduct reflects an offender's bad character. However, the prob-
lem with the character theory is that such blockage does not
explain the role of excuses; it does not explain why the law accepts
excuses as exculpatory. The flaw lies in the fact that in criminal
law, a person might well commit an act that does not reflect, and
is not attributable to bad character, and yet still be guilty for the
act. In such a case, the defendant is guilty, even if she would be
able to gather strong evidence that blocks an inference that the
act reflects or is attributable to her bad character. In other
words, not everything that blocks an inference from prohibited
conduct to bad character does or should qualify as an excuse
under the law. 9
For example, consider the irrelevance of a defendant's good
motive to guilt. Assume that the defendant is an otherwise law-
abiding person who commits a criminal act on the basis of a
good motive - in this case, a once-in-a-lifetime act of civil diso-
bedience. The defendant is still guilty."0 In fact, the power of
her protest rests in large part on her willingness to sacrifice her
liberty, to be arrested and possibly convicted and punished, in
order to publicize a perceived injustice. Such a protester is guilty
of a crime even though her crime does not reflect and is not
attributable to bad character.
As another example, consider an attorney with an exemplary
lifetime record of obeying and upholding the law, who, in a
moment of professional, emotional, and financial crisis, suc-
cumbs to the temptation to borrow money from a Client A's trust
account with the firm intent to return the money at the end of
the same day. To make the illustration more compelling, assume
that the lawyer has a good motive for his ethical and criminal
breach, such as donating the money to a charity to meet an
imminent deadline for raising private matching funds, or using
the money temporarily to make a down-payment on an investiga-
29. DRESSIER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16, § 17.03[D];
Moore, supra note 7, at 51-54.
30. If ajury that is sympathetic to the defendant's cause decides to acquit
her, such a verdict would be an act of jury nullification that conflicts with the
law.
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tor's fee or expenses for an urgent investigation on behalf of Cli-
ent B, who is indigent. The lawyer knows he is doing the wrong
thing, but he yields to temptation, aided in his yielding by his
resolve to repay the money by the end of the day. Unfortunately,
something goes wrong, such as an unexpected need for the trust
account funds on behalf of Client A that day, which leads to the
discovery that the funds are missing. The lawyer is prosecuted
for embezzlement. Under American criminal law, he is certainly
guilty, even though his conduct does not reflect and is not attrib-
utable to an enduring inclination to violate the law.
Next, consider this hypothetical suggested by Joshua
Dressler:
D, a person of exemplary character, loses her job. She
seeks other employment, but months pass without success.
Her family is severely impacted by the loss. Her self-esteem
is threatened. In a period of frustration and deep anguish
she severely batters an unsympathetic employee at a gov-
ernment compensation office. Do we say that D does not
deserve to be punished, that she is not accountable for her
actions? D probably feels guilty for what she has done. Do
we believe that these feelings are unjustified?
3 1
It seems clear that D is guilty of assault, even though her conduct
is out of character for her. Dressler agrees with this view:
The reader's intuition may differ from mine, but I submit
that excusing her, despite her good character and genuine
contrition, would be wrong. She is accountable for her
wrongful acts. Although she should not be imprisoned for
what she has done, blame and punishment are deserved.
The common law and the [Model Penal Code] are consis-
tent with this view: they do not recognize any excuse that
a person of good character may assert in these
circumstances.
3 2
In both this case and the case of the embezzling attorney, the
defendants are guilty. Yet any claim that their conduct reflects or
is attributable to enduring character traits would represent an
unfounded overgeneralization resting on inadequate evidence
about the defendants' character.
Finally, consider this illustration, by Michael Moore,"3 from
the true story, chronicled by Willard Gaylin, of Richard Herrin's
killing of his girlfriend, Bonnie Garland when she tried to break
31. Dressier, Excusing Wrongdoers, supra note 16, at 697.
32. Id. at 697-98.
33. Moore, supra note 7, at 52-54.
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off their relationship. 4 Richard and Bonnie were students at
Yale. Richard, who is Hispanic, grew up in the East Los Angeles
barrio and, as Moore observes, had achieved "stunning success"
by making it to Yale. Bonnie came from a wealthy white family in
Scarsdale, New York. They became romantically involved. When
Bonnie tried to end the relationship gradually, Richard felt "mis-
led, hurt, and frustrasted" by her behavior. One night, when he
was staying at her family's home, Richard killed Bonnie. He had
intended to commit suicide after killing her, but he did not do
so. Richard was charged with murder, but he was convicted of
manslaughter on the basis of extreme emotional disturbance.
Moore comments on this case,
Richard had the capacity not to choose to kill Bonnie, and
he had a fair opportunity to exercise that capacity. None-
theless, he chose to kill her. For that, to my mind, he fully
deserved the eight to twenty-five year sentence he received
for Bonnie's killing. Yet a character theorist should find
this conviction unfair, for the act was out of character for
Richard. 5
Moore observes that Richard himself thought that his sen-
tence was excessive in light of his personality, his background, his
capacity for a productive life, and the fact that he had a clean
arrest record. Moore responds,
Richard wanted credit for an otherwise good - even, in
some ways, exemplary - life. He felt it was unfair to have
eight years of his life taken from him because of a momen-
tary choice that was at odds with who he really was and how
he both had lived and would live his life. His choice to kill
Bonnie in the middle of a sleepless night must have
looked, in retrospect, like an unbelievable action for him.
Yet is there any doubt at all that Richard Herrin was seri-
ously culpable for his choice? No matter how out of char-
acter this act was for him behaviorally, no matter how alien
it seemed to him phenomenologically, he horribly violated
another's rights at a single point in time. His generally
good character puzzles us, because we don't understand
very well how a generally kind, non-violent (if somewhat
weak) individual could do what he did. But such explana-
tory puzzlement is not accompanied by a similar puzzle-
ment about his responsibility: his clear choice to do evil is
sufficient to make him very culpable.3 6
34. Win_.ARD GAYLIN, THE KILLING OF BONNIE GARLAND (1982).
35. Moore, supra note 7, at 52.
36. Id. at 52-53.
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To be sure, the ground of "extreme emotional disturbance"
that apparently led the jury to acquit Richard of murder and to
convict him instead for the lesser crime of manslaughter can be
seen as the operation of a partial excuse. However, as Moore
writes, under character theory, Herrin should have been acquit-
ted outright of all charges, since his conduct did not reflect and
was not attributable to bad character.3 7
The point of these four illustrations is this: there are situa-
tions in which a defendant commits a wrongful act that is out of
character for the defendant, that does not reflect and is not
attributable to the defendant's bad character, and yet in which
the defendant would and should nevertheless be guilty. If this
point is correct, then character theory does not explain the
exculpatory power of excuses. As noted above, the problem with
the character theory account of excuses is not that excuses do
not block the inference that a defendant's conduct reflects or is
attributable to bad character. I think that excuses do, in fact,
block such an inference. However, that blockage does not
explain their exculpatory power. As I will contend below, that
blockage is merely symptomatic of the real explanation of their
explanatory power. 38
B. Character Theory's Criterion of Guilt Conflicts with the Criteria
Actually Used by the Criminal Law
Under character theory, evidence of a person's bad charac-
ter should be both necessary and sufficient as a criterion of guilt.
However, as this section will show, under modem American law,
evidence of a defendant's bad character quite clearly is neither
necessary nor sufficient as a criterion of guilt. At least in theory,
modem American law takes a strong stand against the use of evi-
dence of a defendant's bad or good character as a criterion of
guilt.
First, if character theory were correct, then proof of guilt
should not even require proof of a wrongful act to begin with.
To prove guilt under character theory, it should suffice to prove
37. Id. at 53.
38. As Joshua Dressier has observed, when a normally good person
commits a bad act that seems to be out of character, the person's character
"serves as an impetus to look for an explanation - excuse - for the conduct
that will help us make sense of the situation." Dressier, Excusing Wrongdoers,
supra note 16, at 694. The person's normally good character might also
function "as corroborating evidence of the actor's claim of excuse." Id. at 695.
Yet, as Dressier writes, "[u]sed in this way, a person's character serves simply as a
way to announce our conclusion; it does not appreciably advance the analysis of
determining what 'moral desert' means." Id.
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that a defendant has a bad character. Obviously, this is a radical
claim and I have not seen character theorists make this claim,
but it is the logical extension of character theory's account of
excuses. If an essential criterion of guilt is that a defendant's
criminal conduct creates an inference that his conduct reflects or
is attributable to the defendant's bad character, then as Michael
Moore asks, why require an act at all? 9 Why go through the two-
step process of proving an inference from wrongful act to bad
character? Why not simply permit direct proof of the defend-
ant's character, and dispense with the indirect route of using
proof of a wrongful act to create an inference about bad charac-
ter? As an example, Moore mentions a man whom psychiatrists
had diagnosed as having violent character traits, but who had not
yet acted violently.' If this man has a bad character (and not
just a dangerous character because of a mental illness), then why
not punish him without waiting for him to commit a provable,
violent act? As another example, consider a person who has
committed a violent act that can be proven to reflect or be attrib-
utable to her bad character. She is convicted and punished, and
then she is released when she completes her sentence. Why not
simply arrest and convict her again, as soon as she is released,
without proof of any additional criminal act, since the state has
already proven that she has a bad character?
The strong rejection by American law of evidence of a
defendant's bad or good character as a criterion of guilt further
highlights the problems with character theory. If character the-
ory were correct as a description of American criminal law's views
about the criteria of guilt, then one would expect the law to per-
mit the prosecution and the defense freely to introduce evidence
of a defendant's character during a trial. The prosecution would
seek to introduce relevant evidence of a defendant's bad charac-
ter, either to prove the criterion of bad character directly, or to
prove the inference from wrongful act to bad character. In con-
trast, the defense would seek to introduce relevant evidence of
the defendant's good character, either to raise a reasonable
doubt about the direct criterion of bad character, or to raise a
reasonable doubt about the inference from wrongful act to bad
character.
However, current law quite clearly prohibits the use of char-
acter evidence to prove bad or good character as a criterion of
guilt. Of course, the law does permit the introduction of charac-
ter evidence for certain purposes, but the law is quite precise
39. Moore, supra note 7, at 55.
40. Id. at 54.
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about the narrow scope of such evidence. For example, under
Rule 404(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the prosecution
cannot begin a battle of character evidence. Such a battle can
begin only if the defendant fires the first shot, that is, only if the
defendant first chooses to introduce character evidence.4 '
Surely, if character were a criterion of guilt, the prosecution
would be able to introduce evidence of the defendant's character
first. Moreover, even if the battle of character evidence begins,
its scope is limited. Under Rule 404(a), the only purpose of such
evidence is to show that it is either less or more likely that the
defendant committed the charged act, "for proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion. 4 Yet, if charac-
ter theory were correct, then the legitimate purpose of character
evidence should include showing that the defendant has a good
or bad character generally, regardless of whether such evidence
makes it either less or more likely that the defendant committed
the charged act. Finally, under Rule 405(a), the form of charac-
ter evidence is limited to opinion and reputation testimony. 4'
Rule 404(b) expressly prohibits the use of specific instances of
conduct to show that the alleged crime conformed to the defend-
ant's conduct." All of these restrictions would be quite odd,
indeed, if bad character were a criterion of guilt.45
41. FED. R. EVID. 404 (a) (1) states that evidence of a person's character or
of a character trait is not admissible to prove that the person acted in
conformity with such character or trait except "[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same ....
42. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
43. FED. 1. EVID. 405(a) (inquiry into relevant specific instances of
conduct is allowed on cross-examination).
44. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
45. As a personal comment, I will note that in my experience as a defense
attorney and former prosecutor, unfortunately, prosecutors and defense
attorneys sometimes violate these clear restrictions by using character evidence
or evidence of other wrongs to persuade jurors to render verdicts on the basis
of the defendant's character. On occasion, courts even interpret the law
concerning such evidence in ways that tend to encourage such violations. See,
e.g., State v. Greene, 241 S.E.2d 662, 665 (1978) ("Our Court has been very
liberal in admitting evidence of similar sex crimes in construing exceptions to
the general rule" barring evidence of other wrongs or crimes). Accord, State v.
Williams, 279 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1981); State v. DeLeonardo, 340 S.E.2d 350
(1986). The temptation of practicing attorneys to persuade jurors to render
verdicts on the basis of a defendant's character, rather than on the basis of
whether the defendant committed a crime on a particular occasion, illustrates
the appeal of character theory.
At common law, a homicide committed with extreme recklessness is
regarded as a certain type of murder, a type that, at first glance, might seem to
involve character as an element. A depraved heart murder, for example, was
described by the court in Commonwealth v. Malone, 354 Pa. 180, 183, 47 A.2d
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George Fletcher, who has advocated the character theory of
excuses, has recognized the need to explain why he believes that
character theory accounts for excuses but not for the criteria of
guilt.46 Fletcher has advanced a retributive theory of punish-
ment in which a defendant's desert is "gauged by his charac-
ter."47 Accordingly, Fletcher claims that "a judgment about
character is essential to the just distribution of punishment."
48
To shore up character theory against the plain reality of criminal
law's exclusive focus on acts rather than bad character as a crite-
rion of guilt, Fletcher has posited a side constraint that he con-
tends explains the law's exclusion of proof of bad character as a
criterion of guilt. Fletcher maintains that limiting proof of guilt
to an inquiry into guilt for an act, rather than into bad character,
protects the defendant's privacy:
It might be objected that if punishment should be inflicted
according to the type of person the actor is, then we
should examine the full range of the suspect's deeds -
not just the attributability of a single wrongful act. The
limitation of the inquiry to a single wrongful act follows
not from the theory of desert, but from the principle of
legality. We accept the artificiality of inferring character
from a single deed as the price of maintaining the sus-
pect's privacy. God might judge people on the full range
of their life's work, but the law does not arrogate this func-
tion to itself. The issue in the legal inquiry is not whether,
all things considered, the actor is wicked, but whether a
single instance of wrongful conduct warrants the inference
that the actor deserves punishment. Disciplining the
inquiry in this way restricts the range of relevant informa-
tion, but it secures the individual against a free-ranging
inquiry of the state into his moral worth.49
This explanation of the law's willful blindness to the defend-
ant's character as proof of guilt is not persuasive. First, the law
445, 447 (1946) as entailing "'wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart,
cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty'
which proved that there as at that time 'the state or frame of mind termed
malice.'" (emphasis added). See generally DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAw, supra note 16, § 31.05. Despite the character-laden descriptions used by
courts to describe such murder, the distinctive element at issue in such murder
is the offender's malice at the time of the alleged conduct, rather than the
offender's enduring character. The emphasized portion of the quotation from
Malone illustrates this point.
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does judge defendants on the full range of their lives. It does not
do so to assess guilt or innocence, but it certainly does so during
a sentencing hearing. Immediately after a defendant is con-
victed, the defendant's character is moved to center stage as a
key criterion of punishment. A fundamental question that
Fletcher does not address is why the law treats the defendant's
character as a criterion of sentencing but not as a criterion of
guilt. Why does a defendant's privacy right trump the need to
prove bad character at trial, but not for sentencing? Second, any-
one who has ever served as a prosecutor, as a defense attorney, or
as a detective knows that the pretrial investigation by law enforce-
ment officers can delve quite deeply into a defendant's back-
ground and character. The more serious the case, the more
extensively the police comb through a defendant's background
and character. The law does not protect the privacy of defend-
ants from such investigation. Third, if and when a battle of char-
acter evidence begins, the inquiry into a defendant's moral worth
can be quite extensive and intrusive. For example, Rule 405 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "[o] n cross-examina-
tion, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of con-
duct."5" This rule permits a prosecutor to cross-examine a
defense character witness about prior conduct of the defendant
that is inconsistent with the character trait described by the wit-
ness." Fourth, and most fundamentally, it is profoundly anoma-
lous that the law would choose to be willfully blind to the very
issue claimed by character theory to be the criterion of guilt,
namely, the defendant's character. Similarly, it is odd that the
law would prohibit direct proof of the criterion of bad character,
through an open inquiry at trial into a defendant's character
and, instead, would rely solely on a mere inference from act to
bad character.
Fletcher could advance a better argument, even though
such an argument has its weaknesses and limits. The argument is
that even if bad character is the criterion of guilt, we cannot
know whether a defendant now genuinely has an enduring incli-
nation to violate the law without proof of a criminal act that dem-
onstrates that inclination. Without proof of an act we must
conclude that a defendant has an adequate character for law
abidingness. Even if a person is demonstrably a mean, greedy,
50. FED. R EvID. 405(a).
51. One answer to this argument against Fletcher's view, though, rests on
the fact that under current law, it is the defendant who begins any battle over
character in a trial. A defendant who injects the issue of character into a trial
waives any privacy interest in shielding the defendant's life from an extensive
inquiry into his or her character.
RELEVANCE OF CONDUCT AND CHARACTER
selfish, nasty, and morally bad person who speaks with contempt
for the law and for the interests of others, that person cannot
reliably be said to have a bad character (as I have defined that
term in this article and character theorists have defined the
term)52 unless he or she has broken the law. The proof of bad
character for law abidingness should be in the pudding of crimi-
nal conduct that demonstrates such character. In other words,
we must rely on an inference from act to character rather than
proceeding directly to proof of character because the act is nec-
essary to prove character reliably. "
Unfortunately, this argument is vulnerable, too, as an expla-
nation of current law. If this argument adequately explained cur-
rent law, then we would expect the law to permit the prosecution
to start a battle of character evidence by introducing evidence of
the defendant's character for the purpose of proving the defendant's
bad character as a criterion of guilt, along with proof of a criminal
act. That is, the prosecution would have to prove that the
defendant committed a criminal act, but the prosecution would
also be able to initiate the introduction of character evidence of
the defendant's character to bolster the inference that the act
reflects or is attributable to the defendant's bad character. Yet,
as discussed above, current law steadfastly prohibits just such use
of character evidence, at least in principle.
Another problem with this argument is that under current
law, a defendant can be convicted of a crime committed years
earlier, as long as prosecution is not barred by a statute of limita-
tions, even if reliable evidence would show that the defendant
has changed profoundly and no longer has a bad character.
Under current law, the defendant's character change could be
considered for the purpose of sentencing but not for the pur-
pose of determining guilt or innocence.
In summary, this section has shown that character theory
does not correctly explain either criminal law's criteria for guilt
or the exulpatory role of excuses. The law does not regard bad
character as the criterion for guilt, either directly or in the indi-
rect form of relying on an inference from act to character. The
next section will discuss why the law is correct to base guilt upon
proof of culpably wrongful conduct rather than on the basis of
character.
52. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE LAW'S TREATMENT OF CHARACTER IS CORRECT
A. The Law Correctly Bases Guilt Solely on Proof of Culpably
Wrongful Conduct
The striking fact that serves as the pole star in this analysis is
that the law permits a defendant's character to serve as a crite-
rion of punishment, but not as a criterion of guilt. To under-
stand why the law treats character so differently for the purpose
of determining guilt and innocence and for the purpose of deter-
mining punishment, it is vital to understand the functional rela-
tionship between those two purposes. A clear understanding of
that relationship will demonstrate the wisdom of the law's treat-
ment of character.
The following metaphor can help to illuminate the relation-
ship between the determination of guilt and innocence and the
determination of punishment: under current law, the determina-
tion of guilt at a trial can be seen as a gate through which the
state must pass before the case reaches the arena of punishment.
For a case to pass through that gate, the trier of fact must find
that the defendant committed a criminal act. Once the case has
passed through that gate, the sentencer can consider both the
criminal conduct for which the defendant has just been con-
victed and the defendant's character. In short, the determina-
tion of guilt and innocence has a different purpose from the
determination of punishment. The determination of guilt and
innocence is a jurisdictional threshold that a case must clear before
it becomes appropriate to consider the defendant's bad or good
character for the purpose of determining punishment.
Criminal law's approach of basing proof of guilt on conduct
rather than bad character, and then basing punishment on both
conduct and character - of using the determination of guilt and
innocence as a jurisdictional gate or threshold - is sound for
several reasons. First, consider this basic point, which rests on
principles of classical Lockean liberalism enshrined in the
United States Constitution. Criminal law must balance two com-
peting interests: the interest of any individual, including a crimi-
nal defendant, to be left alone by the state, free from state
interference with life and liberty, against the interest of the state
(acting on behalf of the defendant's fellow citizens) in punishing
crime. Currently and traditionally, American criminal law
resolves the tension between those interests by requiring the
state to have a compelling reason to interfere with a defendant's
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life and liberty before so interfering through punishment.5 3
That resolution is reflected in numerous substantive and proce-
dural protections for defendants, such as the state's high burden
of proof in criminal cases,54 a criminal defendant's right to an
attorney,55 the right to a jury trial,56 the state's duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence to a defendant,57 and the protection
against double jeopardy.5"
That resolution is also reflected in the requirement that
guilt must be based upon proof of a criminal act - of an act that
harms legally protected interests - not upon proof of an inclina-
tion to commit an act. Pinpointing criminal conduct as the com-
pelling event that justifies state intervention rests on a principle
of fundamental fairness: the law must give people a fair opportu-
nity to comply with the law before imposing liability. A defend-
ant cannot control or undo her past and she might not be able to
control her enduring inclinations. However, the premise of the
law is that except in cases involving excuse defenses, a defendant
can control her present conduct.5 9 When a person who can con-
53. See generally JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 3-27 (1984); JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Alburey Castell ed. 1947); Jean Hampton,
Retribution and the Liberal State, 5 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 117, 125 (1994).
54. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
55. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
56. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968).
57. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
58. See Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981).
59. Commentators have long discussed the extent to which a person can
control her character and the extent to which a person can control her conduct
despite a character trait that gives her an enduring disposition to act in a
certain way. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (W.D. Ross trans., 1925),
in THE BASIC WoRKs OF ARISTOTLE 935a, 1114a, 11. 18-23 (Richard McKeon ed.,
1941); Arenella, supra note 14; Dressier, Excusing Wrongdoers, supra note 16, at
695-97; Moore, supra note 7, at 44-48. It seems to me that criminal law rests on
a reasonable premise that regardless of the extent to which people can control
their characters, nevertheless, on specific occasions people with the requisite
capacities and opportunities to choose to avoid criminal conduct can control
their conduct to avoid engaging in such conduct, despite enduring dispositions
to engage in such conduct. Indeed, criminal law holds itself out as a factor that
can help influence people to avoid prohibited conduct. That goal of
deterrence is at the heart of major theories of punishment of general
deterrence, specific deterrence, and moral education. These theories are
discussed more fully below.
Acceptance of this premise of criminal law does not require acceptance of
any particular position in the age-old debate about free will, except to reject the
view of complete, incompatibilist determinism. For a summary of this debate
and the differences between incompatibilist and compatibilist positions about
free will and determinism, see Moore, Causation and the Excuses, supra note 23, at
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trol her present conduct chooses not to do so, then proof of that
choice justifies the state's assertion of its jurisdiction - its con-
trol over the defendant. Proof of that choice gives the state
moral authority to intervene in the defendant's life, to decide
whether and how to punish her, and to take the defendant's
character into account in determining the appropriate punish-
ment. In short, proof that a defendant has committed a crimi-
nal act does not, by itself, create an inference that the defendant
has bad character, as character theory claims. Rather, proof that
a defendant has committed a criminal act is a threshold event
that gives the state authority to decide - during a sentencing
hearing - whether that inference is correct in a given case.
This argument is similar to an argument other commenta-
tors have made to explain why criminal liability should rest on
the commission of a wrongful act as well as a culpable state of
mind, rather than solely on the basis of a culpable state of mind:
we can control our conduct, but we cannot control our thoughts;
fairness requires that the law impose liability only when we have
the opportunity to control ourselves so as to comply with the
law.6
0
A second, related argument in favor of the law's use of proof
of an act as the criterion of guilt rests on the concept of giving
people an incentive to obey the law. As discussed above, criminal
law assumes that people who have the requisite capacities and
opportunity to choose to avoid criminal conduct can choose to
avoid such conduct, despite character traits they might have that
would incline them to engage in conduct prohibited by the law.61
As also discussed, criminal law holds itself out as a factor that can
help influence people to avoid prohibited conduct; the goal of
deterrence of criminal law is at the core of major theories of pun-
ishment.62 In order to give people an incentive to avoid criminal
conduct, the law should base liability on a criterion that people
1112-28; Pillsbury, supra note 11, at 722-26. All that criminal law requires for a
person to be deemed responsible for her conduct is that she have the requisite
capacities and opportunity to take into account the myriad of factors that tend
to serve as deterrents to criminal conduct. Such factors include criminal law's
own prohibitions and threats of punishment, as well as many social, emotional,
moral, and practical factors that serve as reasons to avoid criminal conduct. See
Sendor, Crime as Communication, supra note 10, at 1393-94, 1406 n.142 (degree
of freedom required for criminal responsibility is only the capacity and
opportunity of an actor to incorporate relevant moral and legal factors into the
actor's choice of conduct). This view is consistent with both compatibilist and
incompatibilist positions favoring free choice.
60. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRmrN~AL LAw, supra note 16, § 9.01 [B].
61. See supra note 59.
62. Id.
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can control rather than on a criterion over which people might
have little or no control.63 To encourage all people, including
ex-offenders, to avoid criminal conduct, the law should refrain
from intervening unless they commit a new criminal act. As dis-
cussed above, people might have little control over their charac-
ters, but they might still be able to control their conduct. If the
law can intervene and punish people for having a bad character,
and if the law can continue to intervene in an ex-offender's life
to continue to punish her for having a bad character, then peo-
ple have no control over whether they will be subject to punish-
ment and, therefore, no incentive to comply with the law in
order to avoid punishment. Punishing for acts gives people an
incentive to avoid committing additional criminal acts.
A third argument in favor of the law's current approach is
the principle of fairness among defendants, or legality. This
argument has two parts. First, it would be unfair to excuse a
defendant with a formerly sterling character if the defendant
now commits a crime that is out of character. As will be dis-
cussed below, evidence of the defendant's past character should
be considered in mitigation of punishment, but such evidence
should not shield the defendant from the state's intervention
to determine whether he is an appropriate candidate for
punishment."
The second part of this argument about fairness is that it
would be unfair to convict a defendant with a bad character who
has already been punished for all proven prior criminal conduct.
Even if a defendant appears to have a bad character for law abid-
ingness, shown by previous criminal acts, the defendant should
be free of state intervention if he has been punished for all
proven prior acts. The traditional metaphor used to account for
this rule is that by completing his punishment for all past crimes,
a defendant has "paid his debt to society." If so, the ledger has
been cleared and the state has no authority to intervene in his
life, to consider whether he still has a bad character.
I have recently proposed a theory of guilt and punishment,
called the restorative theory of retributivism, that can serve as an
analytic explanation for this metaphor of crime as the incurring
of a debt and punishment as payment of a debt.65 Briefly,
63. Id. See also H.LA. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 47 (1968)
(permitting excuse defenses gives people the benefit of controlling their lives
through choices about whether, when, and to what extent the law will penalize
them).
64. Dressier, Excusing Wrongdoers, supra note 16, at 698-99.
65. Benjamin B. Sendor, Restorative Retributivism, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 323 (1994).
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according to the restorative theory, criminal law establishes
spheres of autonomy in which individuals' interests are protected
from interference by others. Criminal law creates and enforces
what I call, "relationships of restraint,"66 among all individuals in
a community,
thereby decreeing that if one person's right is sufficiently
important to outweigh another person's pursuit of his or
her own interests, then the second person is prohibited
from engaging in avoidable conduct that injures the first
person's right. In our actions toward one another, we
must refrain from engaging in avoidable conduct that
wrongfully imposes control over the rights of others by
injuring those rights in pursuit of our own interests.67
When a person commits a crime, the criminal act injures the
right violated by the crime. In addition, the criminal act "causes
the social harm of damaging the relationships of restraint
between the offender and the victim and between the offender
and the other members of the community. " " The crime causes
social harm in three ways: the offender imposes control over a
right to which the victim and each member of the community
are entitled to autonomy, the offender devalues the violated
right, and the offender makes the victim and the other members
of the community insecure about the violated right.69
Under the restorative theory, the purpose of punishment is
to restore the relationships of restraint that the crime has dam-
aged. Through punishment, society responds to all three forms
of social harm caused by the crime. Society punishes in order to
defeat or annul the offender's wrongful imposition of control
over the victim's violated right.7" If punishment cannot achieve
that goal, it can at least free the victim and other members of the
community from the continuing and indirect control of the
offender's conduct over their lives by imposing control over the
criminal. Punishment also can refute the criminal's wrongful
assertion or message that he has the power to control the vio-
lated right.7' Punishment can also refute the message conveyed
by the crime that the victim's right is not sufficiently important
for the offender to refrain controlling that right through the
offender's avoidable violation of the right. In other words, pun-
66. Id. at 333.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 334.
69. Id. at 334-36.
70. Id. at 338-39.
71. Id. at 339-40.
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ishment annuls the offender's wrongful devaluation of the vio-
lated right.72 Finally, punishment can bolster the victim's and
community's sense of security about the right by annulling the
offender's control over the violated right to the extent possible,
by annulling the offender's claim of the power to control the
violated right, and by annulling the offender's devaluation of the
violated right.73 All these functions of punishment serve the
overriding purpose of restoring the relationships of restraint that
are damaged by the criminal act. Since punishment is in part a
method of teaching the community about the value of rights,
punishment must be proportionate to the crime. That is, punish-
ment is designed to put the rights of the victim and the offender
in their proper place to the extent possible, not to devalue the
offender's own legitimate interests in life and freedom below
their proper level.74
Under the restorative theory, punishment should end when
the community, speaking through the legislature and the sen-
tencer, determines that the restorative goal of punishment will
be accomplished. 75 Even if punishment does not succeed in
transforming the offender into a person who acts with respect
toward the rights of others, punishment can still accomplish its
restorative purpose by firmly rebutting the offender's wrongful
messages through proportionately harsh treatment of the
offender and by imposing control over the offender's life to a
proportionate degree for a proportionate amount of time. That
is, the completion of a defendant's sentence signifies the restora-
tion of relationships of restraint. Even if the newly released ex-
offender proceeds to commit a new crime, such a crime repre-
sents a new break in the relationships of restraint.
The metaphor of crime as the incurring of a debt and pun-
ishment as a repayment of the debt, then, can be seen in this way:
the debt is the damage to the relationships of restraint and the
repayment is the restoration of those relationships. Once pun-
ishment is deemed to have restored the damaged relationships,
72. Id. at 341-42.
73. Id. at 342-43.
74. Id. at 342. See also Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting
Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1659, 1690-92 (1992).
75. This limitation on punishment would seem to be a corollary of the
principle of proportionality. Once the designated purpose of punishment is
fullfilled, the principle of proportionality requires that punishment cease.
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the debt has been repaid and the ex-offender lives with a clean
slate as far as the state's right to intervene in his or her life.76
The restorative theory also suggests another argument favor-
ing the law's use of criminal conduct rather than bad character
as a criterion of guilt. This argument rests on the interest of a
victim and the community in the determination of guilt. If a
defendant has committed a crime, the victim and the community
have an interest in obtaining a declaration that a violation has
occurred, that the defendant has harmed a legally protected
interest of the victim. If a defendant has damaged the legally
mandated relationships of restraint by violating a right, a guilty
verdict is an important first step in restoring those relationships.
A guilty verdict can help to vindicate the violated right simply by
serving as the community's collective declaration that the
defendant acted wrongly in violating it. Moreover, even when a
defendant is punished, it is important that the defendant, the
victim, and the community regard the punishment not only as
the community's response to the defendant's bad character, but
also as the community's response to the wrongfulness of the
criminal conduct. Under the restorative theory, punishment
must represent a response to the defendant's criminal act, and
not just to the defendant's character, in order to be perceived as
a vindication of the right violated by the defendant.77
This subsection has shown why the law is right to base the
determination of guilt and innocence solely on whether a
defendant has committed culpably wrongftil conduct, rather
than on an inference about a defendant's bad or good character.
The next subsection will address the question of why the law per-
mits punishment to be determined on the basis of both conduct
and character.
B. The Law Correctly Bases Punishment on Both Conduct and
Character
If, as I contend, criminal law is correct in using conduct
rather than bad character as the criterion of guilt, then why
should the law permit a sentencer to rely on a defendant's char-
acter in determining the appropriate punishment? Why can
76. Under sentencing systems that include parole, the parole board plays
an important role in deciding when the purposes of punishment have been
accomplished for a particular offender.
77. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME 177-205 (1995)
(function of criminal trial is serving as declaration of wrongdoing and function
of punishment is signalling community's solidarity with victim).
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character be a proper criterion for sentencing but not for the
determination of guilt?
To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the rele-
vance of a defendant's character under major theories of punish-
ment. An analysis of those theories of punishment shows that a
defendant's bad or good character is an appropriate criterion of
punishment under consequentialist theories - theories that jus-
tify punishment according to its effects on the conduct of the
defendant or others in the future. Such theories include specific
deterrence, general deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilita-
tion.78 However, character would seem not to be a criterion of
punishment under retributive theories of punishment - theo-
ries that justify punishment as a deserved response to past wrong-
doing and to the harm caused by past wrongdoing.79 Character
would be relevant to theories of punishment that combine conse-
quentialist and retributive rationales, such as the denunciation
theory of punishment."0
A defendant's character clearly is an appropriate factor for
the purpose of specific deterrence. If a review of the defendant's
record shows that he is an inveterate recidivist - that he has a
strong and enduring inclination to break the law - then that
fact shows that previous intervention by the state has not
deterred him from criminal activity and that more severe punish-
ment is warranted in order to deter him from future criminal
conduct. On the other hand, if the defendant has a good charac-
ter - for example, he has a spotless criminal record and evi-
dence shows that he has always had a healthy regard for the
rights of others - then those facts indicate that little punish-
ment, or at least reduced punishment, is necessary to deter him
from future criminal conduct.
An offender's character can be an appropriate criterion for
sentencing under the theory of general deterrence. At first
glance, character might not seem to be an appropriate criterion
78. DR.ESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 16, § 2.03[A]-
[B]; FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 6.3.2.
79. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16,
§ 2.03[C] [1]; FLETCHER, supra note 1, §§ 6.3.2, 6.6.2; Sendor, supra note 65, at
356.
80. HART, supra note 63, at 169-73; C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND
PUNISHMENT 41-42 (1987); Sendor, supra note 65, at 350. For theories of
punishment that combine the goal of denunciation with the goal of educating
an offender about the wrongfulness of her conduct, see R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND
PUNISHMENTS 47-54 (1986); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of
Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. Arr. 208 (1984); Sendor, Crime as Communication,
supra note 10, at 1427-28; C.L. Ten, Positive Retributivism, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y
194, 200-05 (1990).
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for determining punishment for the purpose of general deter-
rence. Under this theory, a defendant is punished as an example
for the purpose of deterring others from engaging in criminal
conduct in the future. Punishment is intended to warn other
people of the consequences of criminal conduct. The purpose
of punishment under general deterrence is to persuade people
not to commit criminal acts. It might seem, therefore, that
under the general deterrence theory, an offender should be pun-
ished only for her conduct, not because of her settled inclination
to engage in that conduct. The use of character as a criterion,
then, does not appear to be directly related to the rationale of
deterring people from committing particular acts. Aggravation
or mitigation of an offender's punishment on the basis of his bad
or good character will not contribute to deterring anyone from
committing either the crime committed by that offender or
other crimes. Indeed, mitigation of punishment on the basis of
good character could dilute the deterrent effect of punishment.
Such mitigation could convey the message that an offender will
get a break, will be treated leniently, as long as the offender has a
previously clean record.
Nevertheless, an offender's character could still be anappro-
priate criterion of punishment under the general deterrence the-
ory in the following, limited way: if the defendant is a recidivist
who has demonstrated her bad character through repeated crim-
inal conduct, her character might have a dangerous effect on
others. That is, the defiant quality of her inclination to violate the
law might excite others to adopt her attitude and to engage in
criminal conduct as well. The state might seek to rebut her
message of defiance by increasing her punishment for additional
crimes. Aggravation of her sentence on the basis of her proven
inclination to violate the law might deter others from embarking
on or continuing on a career of crime. For example, habitual
offender laws can be seen as measures designed to deter ex-
offenders from committing additional crimes.
An offender's bad or good character plainly is an appropri-
ate sentencing criterion for the purpose of incapacitating an
offender. The rationale of incapacitation is that punishment -
ordinarily imprisonment - will directly and effectively prevent
an offender from committing additional crimes (that is, crimes
outside of prison) for the duration of the offender's sentence.
Incapacitation can be seen either as a distinct rationale of pun-
ishment or as a form of specific deterrence. Since the rationale
of incapacitation is the necessity of preventing the offender from
committing additional crimes, it is vital to try to gauge how likely
it is that the offender will commit more crimes. Accordingly,
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under the theory of incapacitation, the question of whether the
offender has a bad or good character - whether the offender
has a settled disposition to engage in conduct that is prohibited
by the criminal law - certainly is an appropriate criterion in
determining the sentence.
The rehabilitative function of punishment clearly requires
the use of a defendant's character as a criterion of punishment.
In order to determine the most effective measures to achieve the
goal of rehabilitation, it is necessary to know the extent to which
the defendant's character requires transformation. The more a
defendant is inclined to violate the law, the more she will have to
be rehabilitated. The less a defendant is inclined to break the
law, the less she will have to be rehabilitated.
Under the denunciation justification of punishment, an
offender's character would be an appropriate criterion of pun-
ishment. This theory regards punishment as a way for the com-
munity to express its condemnation of the offender's crime.
Denunciation operates both as a retributive declaration of
wrongdoing and as a utilitarian measure designed to deter the
offender and other people from committing such conduct in the
future. The commission of a crime, by itself, is sufficient cause to
prompt the community to denounce the crime. In addition, if a
defendant has a demonstrated and enduring inclination to
engage in conduct that is prohibited by the law, such bad charac-
ter would warrant additional denunciation for specific deter-
rence purposes and general deterrence purposes.
Whether an offender's character is an appropriate criterion
for punishment under retributive theories of punishment is a
very troublesome question. I do not have a firm position on this
issue, but my tentative view is that character is not an appropriate
criterion for punishment under a retributive theory. The under-
lying rationale of retributive theories is that a defendant should
be punished if and/or only if she deserves to be punished.8 1 The
question, then, is whether a person's good or bad character is an
appropriate criterion of desert. In everyday life, the very concept
of desert seems to me to entail a judgment based upon actual
conduct. We decide that a person deserves reward or punish-
ment because of good or bad acts, respectively, not because the
person has an enduring inclination to commit such acts. Simi-
larly, it seems to me that in criminal law, desert entails a judg-
ment based upon conduct that causes at least social harm and,
81. See supra note 79.
1996]
130 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10
possibly, actual harm to legally protected interests, not a judg-
ment about character.
82
Consider these examples. A defendant is convicted of lar-
ceny. All we know about the defendant is that he committed this
larceny. The sentencer knows nothing about his character,
including whether he has a criminal record. Obviously, the sen-
tencer will determine the robber's desert solely on the basis of
the only relevant fact known by the sentencer, namely, that the
defendant has committed the theft.
Change the hypothetical, so that the sentencer knows this
additional fact: the defendant has no previous criminal record.
The sentencer might well consider this fact as relevant to
whether the defendant has a reduced need for specific deter-
rence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. But for the purpose of
retribution, is the defendant's previously clean record relevant to
his desert? It seems to me that the defendant's desert should still
be based solely on his commission of the harmful act of larceny.
Change the hypothetical a second time, so that the sen-
tencer knows these additional facts: the defendant has no previ-
ous criminal record, the defendant has a solid employment
record, the defendant is a college graduate, and the defendant
has been an important community figure who has always contrib-
uted his time selflessly to charitable causes. Assume for the pur-
pose of this hypothetical example that the defendant is fully
culpable for the criminal conduct for which he has just been con-
victed. The sentencer might well consider these facts as relevant
to whether the defendant has a reduced need for specific deter-
rence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. The sentencer might
also feel inclined to treat the defendant leniently on the basis of
mercy, in light of the defendant's previous life and in light of the
defendant's fine character. Still, do the defendant's sterling life
and his character up to the time of the larceny make him less
deserving of punishment for retributive purposes? Perhaps the
sentencer believes that if this isolated act of larceny is weighed
against the quality of the defendant's entire life, the defendant's
commission of larceny weighs less than it otherwise would weigh.
Yet why is that so? It is not because of the defendant's character
per se. It is not the defendant's enduring inclination to obey the
law or his other admirable character traits that lessen his desert
for the larceny. Rather, it is the cumulative weight of the defend-
ant's good conduct that lessens his desert for the larceny. In
other words, in measuring the harm caused by the defendant,
the sentencer has decided to broaden the relevant temporal con-
82. I thank Joshua Dressler for this helpful insight.
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text to take into account the defendant's record of good deeds as
well as the defendant's single bad deed."3 It is still the relative
harm caused by the defendant, not a weighing of his good and
bad character traits, that determines his desert. The defendant's
character seems relevant to the possibility of mercy, but not to
the defendant's desert.8 4
Change the hypothetical one more time. This time, the sen-
tencer knows that the defendant has been convicted of the lar-
ceny and the sentencer knows these additional facts: the
defendant is a recidivist, with two prior convictions for larceny,
one prior conviction for robbery, and one prior conviction for
forgery in the past ten years; during the sentencing hearing, the
defendant cavalierly says that he has been a career thief because
he has never liked to do honest work, and that he has always
believed that honest work is for chumps. The sentencer might
well consider these facts as relevant to whether the defendant has
an increased need for specific deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. Still, do the defendant's record and his enduring
inclination to violate the law make him more deserving of pun-
ishment? The sentencer might feel outraged by the defendant's
attitude toward the law. This is the counterpart of the sen-
tencer's mitigating feeling of mercy in the previous hypothetical.
Yet the sentencer's feeling of anger should not lead to an aggra-
vated sentence; at worst, it should simply dissuade the sentencer
from making any discretionary reduction in the defendant's
sentence.
Perhaps the sentencer in this case also decides to broaden
the temporal context of desert and, after weighing the harm
caused by the defendant in this case along with the harm caused
by the defendant's prior crimes, decides that the record of the
defendant's crimes increases the defendant's desert. Here, too,
it is not the defendant's bad character per se that has increased
his desert. Rather, it is the cumulative harm caused by the
defendant that increases his desert. However, the sentencer has
not finished adding weight to the defendant's desert: the sen-
tencer decides to increase the defendant's sentence because the
defendant has persisted in committing crimes despite the com-
munity's clear, repeated warnings - through prior convictions
83. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal
Law, 33 STAN. L. Rrv. 591 (1981) (concerning time framing of conduct for the
purpose of determining liability); DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW,
supra note 16, § 9.02[F] (discussing Kelman's analysis and scholarly
commentary on his analysis).
84. Dressier, Excusing Wrongdoers, supra note 16, at 698-99.
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and punishment - to desist.8" Even here, it seems to me, it is
not the defendant's character per se - his enduring disposition
to violate the law - that increases his desert. Rather, as my
restorative theory indicates, his desert is increased by the cumula-
tive social harm caused by his repeatedly claiming the power to
exercise wrongful control over the rights of others, by his
repeated demeaning of the rights of others, and by his cumula-
tive creation of insecurity about rights that increases his desert.8 6
This analysis of the relevance of a defendant's character to
punishment has shown that character is an appropriate criterion
for consequentialist theories of punishment and for mixed theo-
ries of punishment that include consequentialist as well as retrib-
utive rationales. However, character would not be an
appropriate criterion of punishment under a purely retributive
theory of punishment. Modem American law reflects a hybrid of
retributive and consequentialist theories of punishment.87 In
light of this mix, the law understandably permits the use of a
defendant's character as a criterion (although not the sole crite-
rion) of punishment.8"
C. Rehabilitating Character Theory's Valuable Insight
In the introduction to this article, I said that despite my fun-
damental disagreement with character theory, I believe that char-
acter theory rests on a valuable insight. I shall conclude this
article by briefly discussing that insight.
Character theory is based on the view that a criminal act is
not simply a physical act that causes harm to a right, but that a
criminal.act also conveys a message of some type. In other words,
character theory claims that a criminal act has significance, that a
85. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOINGJUSTICE 84-88 (1976) (defiance shown by
recidivists warrants enhanced punishment for habitual offenders).
86. Clearly, a repeat offender's defiant character is an appropriate factor
to consider for consequentialist theories of punishment. The question here,
though, is whether such defiant character is an appropriate factor under
retributive theories of punishment.
87. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1304.12
(1994) (designating retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation
as purposes of punishment).
88. It is clear that character should not be the sole criterion of
punishment. Under the principle of proportionality, the degree of punishment
should, at least to some extent, be linked to the seriousness of the crime. As
Joshua Dressler has discussed, proportionality serves as such a limitation on the
severity of punishment under the retributive, general deterrence, and specific
deterrence theories of punishment, though not under the rehabilitation theory
of punishment. See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16,
§§ 6.01-.05.
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criminal act "says something" important beyond the simple cau-
sation of harm. According to character theory, the relevant
meaning is the inference about the defendant's character,
namely, that the defendant has an enduring inclination to violate
the law.
In this article I have sought to show that character theory is
wrong in contending that the inference about character is or
should be a criterion of guilt. Nevertheless, I believe that charac-
ter theorists are correct in maintaining that a criminal act -
conduct that violates a right protected by criminal law - conveys
meaning beyond the simple causation of harm. I have identified
and discussed at length in previous articles the meaning
expressed by the commission of conduct that violates a right,89 so
I will only summarize it briefly here.
Under my theory, which I have called the "interpretive the-
ory," criminal law is not concerned with the defendant's charac-
ter, but rather with the attitude expressed by a defendant's
conduct toward a legally protected interest at the time he com-
mits an act that wrongfully injures that interest.90 The law
requires that people act with respect toward legally protected
interests - toward "rights." More specifically, the law requires
people to act with sufficient concern for the rights of others so as
to refrain from engaging in reasonably avoidable conduct that
injures those rights.9"
In criminal law (as well as in everyday life) the mental state
with which a person injures an interest expresses the person's
attitude toward that interest at the time of the act. The law uses
the mens rea elements of crimes, such as intent, knowledge, reck-
lessness, and even negligence, as an elaborate interpretive system
for gauging a defendant's disrespect toward a right he has wrong-
fully injured. For example, the wrongful injury of a right with
specific intent to injure it represents a strong form of disrespect.
Even the wrongful injury of a right due to negligent failure to
avoid a risk of harm to the right, signifies that the actor did not
89. See Sendor, Crime as Communication, supra note 10; Sendor, Mistakes of
Fact, supra note 10; Sendor, supra note 65.
90. Sendor, Crime as Communication, supra note 10, at 1397-1400; Sendor,
Mistakes of Fact, supra note 10, at 726-27.
91. Sendor, Crime as Communication, supra note 10, at 1397-1400; Sendor,
Mistakes of Fact, supra note 10, at 726-27. For similar views, see LAcEv, supra note
4, at 176; P.F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT 1-25 (1974); Arenella,
Convicting the Blameless, supra note 22, at 1535-44; Hampton, supra note 74; Jean
Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred and The Retributive Idea, in
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 35-87, 111-61 (Jefrie G. Murphy &Jean Hampton eds.,
1988); Pillsbury, supra note 11, at 743-47.
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act with sufficient respect toward that right to avoid the risk of
harm.
92
The disrespect an offender's criminal conduct expresses for
a violated right contributes to the social harm caused by the
criminal conduct. That disrespect is a facet of the offender's
assertion of the power to control the violated right, it plays a
major role in the demeaning impact of criminal conduct on a
violated right, and it contributes to the insecurity felt by the vic-
tim and others about the right.
93
The criminal justice system designates the trier of fact (nor-
mally the jury) as the primarily authoritative interpreter of a
defendant's conduct. The defendant himself or herself, the
alleged victim, and other witnesses obviously have relevant, legiti-
mate voices in the process of determining the attitude expressed
by the defendant's alleged conduct. However, their subjective
views of that attitude are not dispositive. Even the defendant
cannot make the conclusive determination of the meaning of his
or her own conduct. The trier of fact makes the dispositive inter-
pretation, subject only to deferential review by a trial judge and
appellate courts.94
Character theory is correct in claiming that the commission
of an act prohibited by the criminal law creates an inference that
is required to prove a defendant's guilt. However, character the-
ory is mistaken about the content of the requisite inference. The
incriminating inference is not an inference about the defend-
ant's character over time. Rather, it is an inference about the
disrespect for a right at the time of a violation of the right,
expressed by the defendant's violation of the right. When a
defendant wrongfully injures a right and does so with a prohib-
ited state of mind, the defendant's conduct creates an inference
that the conduct expresses disrespect for the violated right.95 It
92. Sendor, Crime as Communication, supra note 10, at 1417-20; Sendor,
Mistakes of Fact, supra note 10, at 730-34, 737-41.
93. Sendor, supra note 65, at 336-37.
94. Sendor, Crime as Communication, supra note 10, at 1402-03, 1417-20;
Sendor, Mistakes of Fact, supra note 10, at 730-34, 737 n.103.
95. Sendor, Mistakes of Fact, supra note 10, at 743. In that previous article,
I used slightly different terminology. I contended that proof of mens rea
elements of an offense creates a rebuttable presumption of disrespect, and that
excuses function by rebutting that presumption. Id. In that article, I explained
that I chose to use the potentially controversial concept of a "rebuttable,
mandatory presumption" rather than the concept of a permissive presumption
or an inference because I believe that in the absence of an excuse defense, the
proof of the mens rea elements of an offense requires a jury to interpret a
defendant's violation of a right as expressing disrespect toward that right. Id. at
709 n.6, 721 n.45, 743 n.130. For the purpose of this comparison with character
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is often the case that the commission of a criminally wrongful act
also does create an inference about a defendant's bad character
over time. It is often true that conduct that violates a right pro-
tected by the criminal law, and that expresses disrespect for the
violated right, reflects or is attributable to the actor's bad charac-
ter. Such an inference about character, however, is not a crite-
rion of guilt. It is often a symptom of guilt, but it does not
explain the defendant's guilt. It is the defendant's attitude
toward a violated right, at the time of the violation, that serves as
the criterion of the defendant's culpability.
Character theory is also correct in claiming that excuses
operate by blocking an inference. However, once again, charac-
ter theory is mistaken about the content of the inference.
Excuses block the inference that the defendant's violation of a
right expresses disrespect for the right, not an inference about
the defendant's character over time. For example, if a hunter
shoots someone by accident, the accidental quality of the shoot-
ing blocks an inference that the hunter acted with disrespect
toward the victim's rights to life or avoidance of serious bodily
injury. If a person with a serious mental illness commits a crime,
the defendant's mentally disordered nature blocks an inference
that the defendant acted with disrespect toward the violated
right.
The interpretive theory, then, is similar to character theory
in that both theories base culpability on certain meaning con-
veyed by a defendant's conduct. The two theories, however, dif-
fer about the content of that meaning. Character theory
maintains that the commission of an act that violates a right cre-
ates an inference about the defendant's bad character, an infer-
ence that is blocked by an excuse. In contrast, the interpretive
theory maintains that the commission of conduct that violates a
right creates an inference about the defendant's disrespect
toward the violated right at the time of the violation, an infer-
ence that is blocked by an excuse. As discussed in this article,
character theory is seriously at odds with important principles of
criminal law and with the sound philosophy of criminal law,
which focus on culpable conduct rather than bad character as a
criterion of guilt. On the other hand, the interpretive theory's
reliance on the attitude expressed by a wrongful act at the time
of the act conforms to the principles and philosophical founda-
tion of criminal law.
theory, though, the semantic differences between the terms "rebuttable,
mandatory presumption" and "inference" are not important.
1996]
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V. CONCLUSION
The character theory of guilt and excuses claims that guilt
rests on the inference that an offender's criminal conduct dem-
onstrates the offender's bad character, and that excuses operate
by blocking that inference. However, modem American crimi-
nal law steadfastly insists that a defendant's bad or good charac-
ter is not a criterion of guilt, even though character can be
relevant in limited ways to those factors that do serve as criteria
of guilt. Under modem criminal law, guilt rests on proof of an
act that harms a protected interest (a right) and that is commit-
ted with a culpable mental state. Excuses do not block an infer-
ence about character, but rather an inference about a prohibited
attitude of disrespect for a violated right - an inference ordina-
rily created by the commission of a wrongful act with a prohib-
ited state of mind.
Once a trier of fact decides that a defendant is guilty of a
charged offense, however, that verdict serves as a jurisidictional
threshold that permits the sentencer to consider a defendant's
bad or good character under at least some theories of punish-
ment. A convicted defendant's bad or good character is an
appropriate criterion of punishment under consequentialist the-
ories of punishment or under the currently prevailing hybrid the-
ories of punishment that include consequentialist as well as
retributive theories. However, character would not seem to be
an appropriate criterion under purely retributive theories of
punishment.
The law's strict insistence on confining the use of character
as a criterion only for punishment is sound. The law's limitation
of the criteria of guilt to commission of a wrongful act with a
culpable state of mind, rests on concerns of individual freedom
from government intervention, fairness, the value of incentives
to avoid criminal conduct, and the need of victims and the com-
munity for clear declarations of wrongdoing. Our criminal jus-
tice system regards the determination of guilt - gauged solely
on the basis of culpable conduct - as a threshold, jurisdictional
condition for the subsequent consideration (during a sentencing
hearing) of a defendant's culpable conduct and character as cri-
teria of punishment. That restriction in the use of character rests
on a wise appreciation of basic distinctions between the functions
of guilt determination and the functions of punishment.
